Examining the approaches to diminish judicial intervention in statutory adjudication in Australia by Skaik, S. et al.
  
 
 
 
 
Skaik, S., Coggins, J. and Mills, A. 2016, Examining the approaches to diminish judicial intervention 
in statutory adjudication in Australia, in AUBEA 2016 : Proceedings of the 40th Australasian 
Universities Building Education Association Annual Conference, Central Queensland University, 
Rockhampton, Qld., pp. 660-670. 
 
 
 
This is the published version. 
 
 
©2016, The Authors 
 
 
Reproduced by Deakin University with the kind permission of the copyright owner. 
 
 
 
 
Available from Deakin Research Online: 
 
http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30085255 
 660 
EXAMINING THE APPROACHES TO DIMINISH JUDICIAL 
INTERVENTION IN STATUTORY ADJUDICATION IN 
AUSTRALIA 
S. Skaik1, J. Coggins2, A. Mills3  
1Lecturer and PhD Researcher, School of Architecture and Built 
Environment, Deakin University 
2Programme Director and Senior Lecturer, School of Nature & Built 
Environments, University of South Australia 
3Head of School, School of Architecture and Built Environment, Deakin 
University 
skaik@deakin.edu.au 
 
ABSTRACT 
In Australia, statutory construction adjudication is a fast payment dispute 
resolution process designed to keep the cash flowing down the 
hierarchical contractual chain in construction projects. Its rapid, highly 
regulatory and temporarily binding nature have led to it being often 
described as a ‘quick and dirty’ process that delivers ‘rough and ready’ 
justice. Adjudicators often have to grapple with complex legal issues 
related to jurisdictional facts and interpretation of contract provisions, 
though the majority of them are not legally trained. This has often led to 
a poor quality of adjudication outcome for large and complex payment 
claims which has, in turn, led to a mounting dissatisfaction due to the 
many judicial challenges to adjudicators’ determinations seen in recent 
years. The evolving tension between the object of the security of payment 
legislation and excessive involvement of the courts has often been the 
subject of comment by the judiciary. This paper aims to examine the 
legislative and judicial approaches to support the object of the security of 
payment legislation to ease cash flow. The paper adopts a desktop study 
approach whereby evidence is gathered from three primary sources – 
judicial decisions, academic publications and governmental reports. The 
paper concludes that there is a need to adopt other measures which can 
provide more convenient relief to aggrieved parties to an adjudication 
process, such that the adjudication process is kept away from the courts 
as far as is possible. Specifically, it is proposed that a well-designed 
expanded legislative review scheme of allegedly flawed adjudication, 
based on that provided in the Western Australian legislation, might stand 
as a promising remedy to eliminate the evolving tension. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Statutory construction adjudication is a fast-track payment dispute 
resolution process designed to keep the cash flowing down the 
hierarchical contractual chain on construction projects. Its rapid, highly 
regulatory and temporarily binding nature have led to it being often 
described as a ‘quick and dirty’ process that delivers ‘rough and ready’ 
justice. In the context of disputed payment claims for relatively small 
amounts of money for construction work carried out, it may be argued 
that such a nature is both appropriate as well as justified in order to 
protect a vulnerable class of smaller businesses within the construction 
industry. However, the eventuating ‘one size fits all’ coverage of the 
adjudication scheme has, anecdotally, resulted in a mounting swell of 
complaints and dissatisfaction with adjudication outcome of large and/or 
more complex cases. Adjudicators of such cases often have to grapple 
with complex legal issues and large volumes of submissions from the 
parties within very limited timeframes (typically two weeks) with limited 
investigative powers. Such dissatisfaction is manifest in the large amount 
of judicial challenges to adjudicators’ determinations in recent years on 
grounds related to errors of law.   
Since the enactment of legislation in Australia, a significant number of 
judicial review applications have been filed in the State Supreme Courts in 
relation to the security of payment legislation. According to the Society of 
Construction Law Australia (2014, p37), around 80% of adjudication 
determinations that were challenged in the courts in Victoria, Queensland 
and NSW were quashed in 2013. The report also identified the commons 
ground for quashing as breach of natural justice by the adjudicator; want 
of good faith by the adjudicator; want of jurisdiction of the adjudicator; 
actual or reasonable apprehension of bias by the adjudicator; and failure 
by the adjudicator to perform his or her essential role. This may justify 
the conducted investigations on the causes as well as the increased calls 
for reform to limit judicial review to reinstate the main intention of the 
legislation to provide quick and low cost relief to aggrieved parties.  
Via a thorough desktop study approach whereby evidence is garnered 
from three primary sources – judicial decisions, academic publications and 
governmental reports – this paper aims to examine not only the diverse 
approaches in judicial review in dealing with determinations but also the 
main legislative approaches to ease the tension between the SOP object 
and court involvement.  
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BROAD APPROACH TO JURISDICTIONAL FACTS 
The courts in the East Coast model jurisdictions have adopted a narrow 
approach when considering jurisdictional facts for the purpose of judicial 
review, which has led to the quashing of many determinations1. 
Accordingly, the Victorian Supreme Court has recognised that, “critically, 
an adjudicator is given no express power in s 23 of the Victorian Act, or 
anywhere else in the Act, to decide facts which may go to his or her 
jurisdiction”2. Notwithstanding this, however, the Victorian Supreme Court 
has also highlighted the drawbacks if a broad approach is not required by 
the legislation to be adopted by the courts when considering essential 
jurisdictional facts, other than those established in Brodyn, stating:  
“[i]f the Act does make the jurisdiction of an adjudicator contingent 
upon the actual existence of a state of facts, as distinguished from 
the adjudicator’s determination that the facts do exist to confer 
jurisdiction, in my opinion the legislation would not work as it was 
intended to. Unnecessary challenges to the jurisdiction of an 
adjudicator appointed under the Act would expose the procedures to 
delay, cost and expense. The very purpose of the Act would be 
compromised”3. 
His Honour went on to propose: 
“For these reasons, in my opinion, in order to serve the purposes of 
the Act, the intention of the legislation is to confer upon an 
adjudicator the capacity to determine facts which go to his or her 
jurisdiction, subject to exceptions of the type to which I have 
referred. It follows that, in making those determinations, the Act 
confers on adjudicators jurisdiction to make an incorrect decision in 
relation to such jurisdictional facts which will not be overturned by 
certiorari” 4. 
In Western Australia, the Supreme Court has been consistent in adopting 
a broad approach when dealing with jurisdictional facts under section 
31(2)(a), considering the adjudicator’s role to be analogous to an inferior 
court5. However, in the recent judgment of Laing O’Rourke Australia 
Construction Pty Ltd v Samsung C & T Corporation6, Mitchell J, expressed 
his reservations about the broad sense approach which an adjudicator is 
empowered to authoritatively to determine.  
                                               
1 See, eg, Sugar Australia Pty Ltd v Southern Ocean Pty Ltd  [2013] VSC 535 at [66]; Chase Oyster Bar v 
Hamo Industries [2010] NSWCA 190. 
2  See Sugar Australia Pty Ltd v Southern Ocean Pty Ltd [2013] VSC 535 at [107]. 
3  Grocon Constructors Pty Ltd v Planit Cocciardi Joint-Venture [2009] VSC 426 at [115]. 
4  Grocon Constructors Pty Ltd v Planit Cocciardi Joint-Venture [2009] VSC 426 at [116]. 
5  See, eg, Wqube Port of Dampier v Philip Loots of Kahlia Nominees Ltd [2014] WASC 331 at [78]; Cape Range 
Electrical Contractors Pty Ltd v Austral Construction Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 304 at [83]. 
6 [2015] WASC 237. 
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The Society of Construction Law Australia (2014, p68) endorsed the broad 
sense approach and elaborated that: 
The legislation might explicitly provide that an adjudicator must 
proceed to determine an application for adjudication if the 
adjudicator is satisfied on reasonable grounds that the application 
was made within any relevant time limits, rather than providing that 
the adjudicator must proceed to determine an application for 
adjudication if the application was (in fact) made within time. 
Decisions of adjudicators under the former type of provision would 
still be subject to a level of judicial supervision but would limit the 
availability of judicial review and discourage applications for judicial 
review. 
Whilst such recommendation looks promising on its face, it is argued that 
unless adjudicators are well experienced and legally trained in identifying 
jurisdictional matters, the risk of judicial review against errant 
adjudicators will remain high.  
REMITTING JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE DETRMINATIONS 
Australian case law has been inconsistent regarding the remittal of invalid 
determinations to the adjudicator. The Australian Capital Territory 
legislation includes a unique section which gives the Supreme Court 
express authority to remit adjudication decisions referred to it to the 
original adjudicator or a new adjudicator appointed by the court, for 
reconsideration with its opinion on the question of law the subject matter 
of appeal.7 If an adjudication decision is remitted, the adjudicator must 
make the new adjudication decision within ten business days after the day 
the decision was remitted, or within a time period directed by the 
Supreme Court8. The ACT Supreme court exercised its remittal authority 
for the first time in Fulton Hogan Construction Pty Ltd v Brady Marine & 
Civil Pty Ltd9. In that case, Mossop AsJ found that the adjudicator made a 
manifest error of law which could substantially affect the legal rights of 
the parties and held: 
“In my view it is appropriate to remit the adjudication decision to 
the adjudicator who made the original decision.  That is because 
there will be cost and time efficiencies in having the original 
decision-maker reconsider the claim. I do not accept that the fact 
that the adjudicator has been found to have made an error of law is 
a reason for remitting the decision to a different adjudicator.”  
In Victoria, despite the fact the Victorian Act is silent regarding remittal, 
the Victorian Supreme Court has nevertheless remitted several cases to 
                                               
7  Building and Construction Industry (Security of Payment) Act 2009 (ACT), s 43 6(b).  
8  Building and Construction Industry (Security of Payment) Act 2009 (ACT), s 43 (7). 
9  [2015] ACTSC 384 at [67] (Mossop AsJ). 
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the relevant Authorised Nominating Authorities for further remittal to the 
original adjudicator10. In Maxstra Constructions Pty Ltd v Joseph Gilbert11, 
Vickery J held that, where an order in the nature of certiorari is granted, 
the usual form of relief is to quash the decision (or part thereof) under 
review and remit it back to the tribunal for reconsideration according to 
law. In the recent case of Plenty Road v Construction Engineering (Aust) 
(No 2)12, Vickery J examined whether the flawed determination should be 
remitted to the original adjudicator, or a different one, eventually deciding 
to remit the case to the original adjudicator to avoid delay in the process, 
since the original adjudicator was fully familiar with the case. Vickery J 
further asserted that “minimisation of delay in the decision-making 
process promotes a central aim of the Act”13. 
In NSW, the Act is also silent as to whether the court has power to remit 
erroneous determinations. However, an order under section 69 of 
the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) in the nature of mandamus could be 
made, so that the court may order an adjudicator to reconsider an 
application and make a determination according to law. This possibility 
was discussed, obiter by McDougall J in Trysams Pty Limited v Club 
Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd14. However, his Honour opined that “there 
may arise cases where it would be inappropriate to make such an order, 
and more appropriate to leave the dissatisfied claimant to its rights under 
s26(2)”.15 
Eventually, the NSW Court of Appeal, in Cardinal Project Services Pty Ltd 
v Hanave Pty Ltd16, resisted the possibility of remittal. In that case, 
Macfarlan JA, with whom Tobias AJA agreed, pointed out that, by the time 
the adjudicator decided the matter after remittal, circumstances might 
have changed significantly from the time when the adjudicator was 
considering his original determination (eg the payment schedule may be 
outdated, other defects may have come to light and so on.). His Honour 
went on to say that the exemption of adjudicators’ decisions under the 
Act from the scope of judicial review is a further indication of a legislative 
desire that the Act’s mechanisms be quick, cheap and simple. Also, any 
remittal order would necessarily require the adjudicator to make a 
decision outside the time permitted by section 25(3), unless the parties 
agreed to an extension of time. Macfarlan JA further opined that: 
“[i]f the legislature had adverted to the question of what should 
happen when a purported but void determination is issued pursuant 
to an adjudication application, it may have provided that that 
                                               
10  See Maxstra Constructions Pty Ltd v Gilbert t/as AJ Gilbert Concrete [2013] VSC 243; Metacorp Pty Ltd v 
Andeco Construction Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] VSC 255. 
11 [2013] VSC 243 at [72]. 
12  [2015] VSC 680. 
13  Plenty Road v Construction Engineering (Aust) (No 2)  [2015] VSC 680 at [31]. 
14  [2008] NSWSC 399 at [80]-[89]. 
15 [2008] NSWSC 399 at [90]. 
16 Cardinal Project Services Pty Ltd v Hanave Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 399 at [100-103]. 
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application should remain on foot but be remitted to the original 
adjudicator”17.  
In Queensland, the Court of Appeal, in Heavy Plant Leasing Pty Ltd v 
McConnell Dowell Constructors (Aust) Pty Ltd18, followed a similar position 
to that of Macfarlan JA, in which Muir JA, with whom Gotterson JA and 
Morrison JA agreed, held that “the provision of such a remedy would be 
contrary to the quick, cheap and simple processes envisaged by the Act”. 
In BM Alliance Coal Operations Pty Ltd v BGC Contracting Pty Ltd19, Muir 
JA, with whom Holmes JA and Lyons J agreed, stated that no arguments 
were raised by the parties on whether remittal to the adjudicator was 
legally possible and concluded that remittal is doubted to be a desirable 
option for that case. Wallace (2013, p224) also argued that any legislative 
amendment providing the court with an express power to remit the 
matter to the adjudicator or another adjudicator is not a preferable 
outcome. 
SEVERANCE OF INFECTED PART OF DETERMINATION 
Sometimes, a part of the adjudication decision may be infected by a 
jurisdictional error, which would, generally speaking, invalidate the entire 
determination. This rule has been criticised as it “produced inconvenient 
consequences”.20 However, in Emergency Services Superannuation Board 
v Sundercombe,21 McDougall J, in an attempt to give indirect effect to an 
invalid determination, required the respondent to pay the amount 
unaffected by the error as a condition to set aside the adjudicator’s 
determination. In Cardinal Project Services Pty Ltd v Hanave Pty Ltd22, 
the NSW Court of Appeal held that:  
“Such an approach has much to recommend it, particularly, it might 
be added, if the claimant is otherwise unable to pursue its original 
payment claim to achieve a second adjudication. However, such 
conditional relief can itself only be valid if it is designed to achieve a 
legitimate purpose”.23 
In Victoria, it was judicially decided that severance is technically possible 
as a common law doctrine which helps attain the object of the legislation 
in some cases24. Wallace (2013, p224) explained the logic of allowing 
severance from a commercial perspective as “the parties may have 
already expended significant costs on the adjudication and court 
processes. If the court is able to sever the affected part of the 
                                               
17 Cardinal Project Services Pty Ltd v Hanave Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 399 at [97]. 
18 [2013] QCA 386 at [67]. 
19 [2013] QCA 394 at [87]. 
20 Sunshine Coast Regional Council v Earthpro Pty Ltd [2015] QSC 168 at [73] (Byrne SJA). 
21 [2004] NSWSC 405. 
22 NSWCA 399 at [52]. 
23 Cardinal Project Services Pty Ltd v Hanave Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 399 at [52]. 
24 Gantley Pty Ltd v Phenix International Group Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 106 at [115-116]; Maxstra Constructions 
Pty Ltd v Gilbert t/as AJ Gilbert Concrete [2013] VSC 243 at [77]. 
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adjudication decision then there will be significant cost advantages in 
doing so”. As a result, Queensland amended its Act in 2014, introducing, 
inter alia, a new section which provides that:  
“If, in any proceedings before a court in relation to any matter 
arising from a construction contract, the court finds that only a part 
of an adjudicator’s decision under Part 3 is affected by jurisdictional 
error, the court may identify the part affected by the error and 
allow the part of the decision not affected by the error to remain 
binding on the parties to the proceeding”25.  
In many other cases, the courts have emphasised that the legislation 
should be amended so as to permit so much of an adjudicator’s decision 
as is not affected by jurisdictional error to stand26. Having said that, 
introducing such a provision within legislation, without sufficient guidance 
on how a court is to allow part of an adjudication decision, could bring 
many other difficult questions and valid concerns regarding its practicality 
and application. For instance, Davenport (2015, p8) argued: “Is a breach 
of natural justice by an adjudicator a ‘jurisdictional error’ within the 
meaning of s 100(4)”? However, it has been applied without issue.27 
IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF ADJUDICATION OUTCOME 
In the wake of such inevitable drift in the legislative intent where more 
adjudication determinations concerning large claims have been challenged 
successfully in court, the Queensland legislation was substantially 
amended in December 201428. The amendments include, inter alia, 
allowing longer timeframes for adjudicators, as well as respondents, in 
complex cases and strict regulations to train and maintain competent 
adjudicators. To cope with the introduced changes, the legislation 
imposed mandatory transitional training upon all adjudicators, alongside 
the “legally oriented” mandatory training course29. That transitional 
training covers modules including the 2014 amendments, contract law, 
construction law, making and writing decisions, judicial ethics and natural 
justice, deciding jurisdiction, valuing work and legal principles. As such it 
was argued that with the longer timeframes, it becomes more difficult and 
costly for contractors to obtain progress payment. Appointing adjudicators 
where the government is party to adjudication, selection criteria of 
                                               
25  Building and Construction Industry Payments Act 2004 (Queensland), s 100(4). 
26  See, eg, James Trowse Constructions Pty Ltd v ASAP Plasterers Pty Ltd [2011] QSC 345, [57-[59]; Thiess 
Pty Ltd v Warren Brothers Earthmoving Pty Ltd [2012] QSC 373, [61]-[62]; eg, BM Alliance Coal Operations 
Pty Ltd v BGC Contracting Pty Ltd (no 2) [2013] QSC 67 at [35-37]; Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd v Luikens 
[2003] NSWSC 1140 at [90-92] (Palmer J); Lanskey Constructions Pty Ltd v Noxequin Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 
963 at [21-22]. 
27 See Sunshine Coast Regional Council v Earthpro Pty Ltd [2015] QSC 168, and previous excision prior to the 
BCIPA being amended is evidenced in Hansen Yuncken Pty Ltd v Ian James Ericson trading as Flea’s 
Concreting [2011] QSC 327. 
28 See Building and Construction Industry Payments Amendment Act (2014), Act No. 50 of 2014 (Qld). 
29 See the Building and Construction Industry Payments Regulation 2004, schedule 1, part 2. 
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adjudicators, and imposing further training on adjudicators were also 
criticized for the Registrar’s lack of probity (Davenport, 2015).  
Despite these amendments in Queensland, however, the latest monthly 
report by the Queensland Building and Construction Commission in 
December 2015 revealed that there have been seven judicial review court 
applications between December 2014 and November 2015, (comparing to 
15 applications in the preceding year), in which the Queensland Supreme 
Court found that adjudicators committed jurisdictional errors in three 
cases. The continuation of erroneous determinations indicates that the 
quality assurance measures may not be sufficient. On the other hand, the 
number of judicial challenges may further emphasise that many desperate 
respondents may always seek to knock on the door of judicial review as a 
gaming tactic in an attempt to delay payment regardless of the quality of 
adjudication outcome. Having said this, it may be too early to have any 
certainty as to the effectiveness of the recent amendments to the 
Queensland legislation. 
INTERNAL REVIEW OF ADJUDICATOR’S ‘DECISION TO DISMISS’  
Under the Australian West Coast model, unlike all other jurisdictions, 
there is an express right of review by application in respect of an 
adjudicator’s decision to dismiss without a consideration of the merits of 
the application on certain grounds. These grounds include that the 
contract concerned is not a construction contract, the application has not 
been prepared and served in accordance with the requirements of the Act, 
and the adjudicator is satisfied that it is not possible to fairly make a 
determination because of the complexity of the matter or the prescribed 
time or any extension of it is not sufficient for any other reason (See, eg, 
Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA Act), s 31(2)(a)).  
This review is carried out by the State Administrative Tribunal (WASAT) in 
Western Australia (WA) and by the local court in the Northern Territory 
(NT). The WASAT has jurisdiction to review the adjudicator’s ‘decision to 
dismiss’ upon application by either party and the reviewed decision can be 
affirmed, varied, set aside, or sent back to the adjudicator for 
reconsideration, in accordance with any directions, or recommendations, 
which the WASAT considers appropriate.30 If the decision is reversed and 
remitted, the adjudicator is to make a determination within 14 days after 
the date upon which the decision was reversed, or any extension of that 
time consented to by the parties.31 
Judicially, it was decided that all grounds upon which a review is sought 
are jurisdictional facts.32 In O’Donnell Griffin Pty Ltd v John Holland Pty 
                                               
30 State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 29 (3). 
31 See Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA), section 46 (2). 
32 See Perrinepod Pty Ltd v Georgiou Group Building Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 217 [16]. 
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Ltd,33 Beech J held that the WASAT also has jurisdiction to review the 
adjudicator’s ‘decision not to dismiss’. To reach this proposition, Beech J 
examined the object of the WA Act and found that the review by the 
WASAT of an adjudicator’s decision not to dismiss was ‘more 
expeditious’34 and more consistent with the scheme of the WA Act than 
the ‘slower and more cumbersome prerogative relief’.35 That proposition 
was eventually overturned by the Court of Appeal in Perrinepod Pty Ltd v 
Georgiou Group Building Pty Ltd,36 in which the Court held: 
…insofar as the Tribunal would provide a quicker avenue for relief, a 
right of review to the Tribunal where an application is dismissed is 
conducive to the statutory purpose of 'keeping the money flowing'. 
On the other hand, no evident statutory purpose is served by 
expediting a review of a 'decision' 'not to dismiss', with a view to 
rendering inapplicable the adjudication process facilitated by the 
Act. 
A review by the WASAT involves a hearing de novo on the merits in which 
material which was not before the decision-maker may be considered.37 
Apparently, there is an inconsistency between the WA Act and a 
hearing de novo. In Marine & Civil Bauer Joint Venture and Leighton 
Kumagai Joint Venture,38 strict limitations have been imposed upon 
allowing new submissions before the WASAT and it was held: ‘In my view, 
no new material should be permitted because, if the decision under 
review is reversed, and the matter referred back to the adjudicator, I 
consider that the adjudicator must remain bound to decide the matter on 
the material which was originally before the adjudicator…’ 
Interestingly, the WA Act, section 46(3) provides that, except as provided 
as grounds for the limited review, a decision or determination of an 
adjudicator on an adjudication cannot be appealed or reviewed. The WA 
Supreme Court interpreted this section in Red Ink Homes Pty Ltd v 
Court,39  stating that the provision only limits the appeal before the 
Tribunal, whilst judicial review will still be open for the aggrieved party. 
Furthermore, section 105 of the WASAT Act provides for an appeal to the 
Supreme Court from a decision of the WASAT, provided that the Court 
grants leave to appeal which is limited only on a question of law. 
Since the commencement of the WA Act in 2005 until end of June 2015, 
the WASAT has reviewed 37 decisions of adjudicators dismissing 
applications without considering the merits. In 25 cases, the adjudicators’ 
                                               
33 [2009] WASC 19 (Beech J).  
34 [2009] WASC 19 [122]. 
35 [2009] WASC 19 [131]. See Also, Thiess Pty Ltd v MCC Mining (WA) Pty Ltd [2011] WASC 80 [44] (Corboy 
J). 
36 [2011] WASCA 217 [129]. 
37 State Administrative Tribunal Act (2004), s 27. 
38 [2005] WASAT 269 [70]-[71]. 
39 [2014] WASC 52 [72]-[76]. 
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decisions were upheld while, 12 cases (amounting to 37%) were set 
aside or remitted to the original adjudicator to revisit the original decision 
to dismiss.  Notably, the review applications before the WASAT have been 
constantly increasing over the years. Table (1) below demonstrates an 
extract from the relevant annual reports on the operation of the review 
mechanism from 2008 until 2015. 
Table 1 Operation of the review mechanism of adjudicators’ decisions to 
dismiss in WA40 
Description Annual review applications by the WASAT 
Financial year  
2008-
2009 
2009-
2010 
2010-
2011 
2011-
2012 
2012-
2013 
2013-
2014 
2014-
2015 
No. of lodged applications 105 172 197 178 208 175 235 
No of dismissed 
application by 
adjudicators for no 
jurisdiction. 
25 57 57 40 74 47 52 
No. of review applications 
by the WASAT 
4 4 3 5 5 7 8 
No. of remittal/set aside 
cases by the WASAT 
0 0 0 2 1 3 2 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This paper has examined the main legislative and judicial approaches to 
diminish court involvement in the operation of the SOP legislation. The 
paper concludes that the examined approaches do not provide effective 
and practical measures, and there is a need to adopt other pragmatic 
measures that can provide a more convenient relief to either party 
aggrieved by the hasty adjudication process. This would help to confine 
adjudication process away from court and reinstate the object of the 
security of payment legislation to facilitate cash flow within the 
construction industry.  
Moving forward, a well-designed expanded legislative review scheme of 
erroneous adjudication decisions on jurisdictional grounds might stand as 
a more convenient remedy. The lead Author is currently undertaking a 
further research as part of his PhD study upon the need, features and 
potential impact of such review mechanism throughout Australia. 
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